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Microstructure Theory and the Foreign Exchange Market
GROWING BODY OF theoretical literature, known as the study of securities market microstructure, deals with the behavior of participants in securities markets and with the effects of information and institutional rules on the economic performance of those markets. These institutional factors may arise from technology, tradition or regulation. Microstructure and its impact are important, because of the vast amounts of wealth which pass through securities marketsincluding the foreign exchange marketevery day.
Microstructure is of interest to students of the foreign exchange market: microstructural analyses of other markets have yielded insight into traders' behavior and the effect of various institutional arrangements. Conversely, the foreign exchange market is also of special interest to students of microstructure, because it combines two very different arrangements for matching buyers and sellers -bank dealers trade with one another both directly and through foreign exchange brokers.1
Standard models of exchange-rate determination concentrate on relatively long-run aspects, such as purchasing power parity. While microstructure theory cannot address these issues directly, it can illuminate a more narrowly focused array of institutional concerns, such as price information, the matching of buyers and sellers, and optimal dealer pricing policies. Despite the substantial literature on microstructure, little attention has been paid to the particular microstructure of the foreign exchange market.2 'Similar arrangements exist for other securities-for example, the federal funds market and the secondary market for Treasury securities-but these too have been relatively neglected in the literature. 2 The shaded insert on the opposite page provides a context in which the microstructural approach can be compared with more traditional approaches to market efficiency. Following some early articles by Demsetz (1968) , Tinic (1972) and Tinic and West (1972) , Garman (1976) performed the crucial task of defining market microstructure as an independent area of the literature, thus focusing the debate. Since then, market microstructure has burgeoned, led by Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1978a , 1978b , 1981 , Amihud and Mendelson (1980 , 1986 , 1988 , Stoll (1978 Stoll ( , 1985 Stoll ( , 1989 and Stoll (1980, 1981) . See also Beja and Hakansson (1977) , Cohen, Hawawini, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1980) , Cohen, Maier, Ness, Okuda, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1977) , Amihud, Ho, and Schwartz (1985) , Schreiber and Schwartz (1986) , Schwartz (1988) and Cohen and Schwartz (1989) . Whitcomb (1979, 1986) and Stoll (1985) have surveyed the microstructure literature. In addition to the early note by Allen (1977) , very recently there have appeared some microstructural studies of the foreign exchange market: Bossaerts and Hillion (1991) , Lyons (1991) , Rai (1991) and Flood (1991) . There is also an empirical literature measuring the determinants of the bid-ask spread in the foreign exchange market. See Black (1989) , Wei (1991) and Glassman (1987) as well as the references therein. Because the focus of this article is on microstructure theory, such empirical studies receive little attention here. Finally, although a consideration of the results of laboratory experiments would expand the scope of this paper to unwieldy dimensions, their role in establishing the sensitivity of market behavior to institutional factors must at least be acknowledged; see Plott (1982 Plott ( , 1991 for an introduction. This paper examines the extant literature on market microstructure to determine how it might be applied to the foreign exchange market.
The paper begins with a brief description of the foreign exchange market. Aspects of the literature concerned with institutional details are addressed second, noting how such details can affect the performance of the market. Next, the literature dealing with behavioral details, especially the communication and interpretation of price information, is considered. Finally, the interaction of institutional and behavioral factors, notably the bid-ask spread, is discussed.
INSTITUTIONAL BASICS OF THE FOREIGN EXCHANGE MARKET
The foreign exchange market is the international market in which buyers and sellers of currencies "meet."
3 It is largely decentralized:
the participants (classified as market-makers, brokers and customers) are physically separated from one another; they communicate via telephone, telex and computer network. Trading volume is large, estimated at $128.9 billion for the U.S. market in April 1989. Most of this trading was between bank market-makers.T he market is dominated by the market-makers at commercial and investment banks, who trade currencies with each other both directly and through foreign exchange brokers (see figure IL" Market-makers, as the name suggests, "make a market" in one or more currencies by providing bid and ask prices upon demand. A broker arranges trades by keeping a "book" of marketmaker's limit orders -that is, orders to buy (alternatively, to sell) a specified quantity of foreign currency at a specified price -from which he quotes the best bid and ask orders upon request. The best bid and ask quotes on a broker's book are together called the broker's "inside spread." The other participants in the market are the customers of the market-making banks, who generally use the market to complete transactions in international trade, and central banks, who may enter the market to move ex- change rates or simply to complete their own international transactions. Market-makers may trade for their own account -that is, they may maintain a long or short position in a foreign currency -and require significant capitalization for that purpose. Brokers do not contact customers and do not deal on their own account; instead, they profit by charging a fee for the service of bringing market-makers together.
The mechanics of trading differ substantially between brokered transactions and direct deals. In the direct market, banks contact each other. The bank receiving a call acts as a market-maker for the currency in question, providing a twoway quote (bid and ask) for the bank placing the call. A direct deal might go as follows:
Mongobank: "Mongobank with a dollar-mark please?" (Mongobank requests a spot market quote for U.S. dollars (USD) against German marks (DEM).)
3 For more thorough descriptions of the workings of the foreign exchange market, see Burnham (1991 ), Chrystal (1984 , Kubarych (1983) and Riehl and Rodriguez (1983 The other method of interbank trading is brokered transactions. Brokers collect limit orders from bank market-makers. A limit order is an offer to buy (alternatively to sell) a specified quantity at a specified price. I,imit orders remain with the broker until withdrawn by the market-makerThe advantages of brokered trading include the rapid dissemination of orders to other market-makers, anonymity in quoting, and the freedom not to quote to other market-makers on a reciprocal basis, which can be required in the direct market. Anonymity allows the quoting bank to conceal its identity and thus its intentions; it also requires that the broker know who is an acceptable counterparty for whom. Limit eThe Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) is an electronic message network. In this case, it conveys a standardized payment order to a German branch or correspondent bank, which, in turn, effects the payment as a local interbank transfer in Frankfurt. TheClearing House for Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) is a private interbank payments system in New York City.
orders are also provided in part as a courtesy to the brokers as part of an ongoing business relationship that makes the market more liquid. Because his limit order is often a market-maker's first indication of general price shift, Brooks likens the posting of an order with a broker "to sticking out the chin so as to be acquainted with the moment that the fight starts." 8 Schwartz points out that posting a limit order extends a free option to other traders.Ã market-maker who calls a broker for a quote gets the broker's inside spread, along with the quantities of the limit orders. A typical call to a broker might proceed as follows: Value dates and payment arrangements are the same as in the direct dealing case. In addition to the payment to the counterparty bank, the banks involved share the broket-age fee. These fees are negotiable in the United States. They are also quite low: roughly $20 per million dollars transacted.'°t See Brooks (1985 ), p. 25. 9 See Schwartz (1988 ), p. 239. '°SeeBurnham (1991 ), p. 141, note 16, and Kubarych (1983 , p. 14. The final category of participants in the foreign exchange market is the corporate customers of the market-making banks. Customers deal only with the market-makers. They never go through brokers, who cannot adequately monitor their creditworthiness. Typically, a customer transacts with a bank with which it already has a well-established relationship, so that corporate creditwor-thiness is not a concern for the bank's foreign exchange desk, and trustworthiness is not an issue for the customer. The mechanics of customer trading are similar to those of direct dealing between market-makers. A customer requests a quote, and the bank makes a two-way market; the customer then decides to buy, sell or pass. The chief difference between this and an interbank relationship is that the customer is not expected ever to reciprocate by making a market.
Participants in the foreign exchange market also deal for future value dates. Such dealing composes the forward markets. Active forward markets exist for a few heavily traded currencies and for several time intervals corresponding to actively dealt maturities in the money market. Markets can also be requested and made for other maturities, however. Since the foreign exchange market is unregulated, standard contract specifications are matters of tradition and convenience, and they can be modified by the transacting agents.
Forward transactions generally occur in two different ways: outright and swap. An outright forward transaction is what the name implies, a contract for an exchange of currencies at some future value date. "Outrights" generally occur only between market-making banks and their commercial clients. The interbank market for outrights is very small, because outright trading implies an exchange rate risk until maturity of the contract. When outrights are concluded for a commercial client, they are usually hedged immediately by swapping the forward position to spot. This removes the exchange rate risk and leaves only interest rate risk.
A swap is simply a combination of two simultaneous trades: an outright forward contract and an opposing spot deal. For example, a bank might "swap in" six-month yen by simultaneously buying spot yen and selling six-month forward yen. Such a swap might be used to hedge an outright purchase of six-month yen from a bank customer. ' 1 In effect, the swapping bank is borrowing yen for the six months of the outright deal. The foreign exchange market-maker swaps in yen -rather than simply borrow yen on a time deposit -because banks maintain separate foreign exchange and money market accounts for administrative reasons. Swapping is generally the preferred means of forward dealing (see figures 2 and 3).
In practice, the vast majority of foreign exchange transactions involve the U.S. dollar and some other currency. The magnitude of U.S. foreign trade and investment flows implies that, for almost any other currency, the bilateral dollar exchange markets will have the largest volume. Consequently, the dollar markets are the most liquid. The possibility of triangular arbitrage enforces the law of one price for the cross rates. The upshot is that liquidity considerations outweigh transaction costs. A German wanting "Hedging an outright purchase of currency with an opposing swap deal still leaves an open spot purchase of the currency. This can be easily covered in the spot market. pounds, for example, will typically convert marks to dollars and then dollars to pounds, rather than trading marks for pounds directly. Though this is especially true in the American market, it holds for foreign markets as well.
The microstructure literature is by nature market-specific, and much of it concerns U. S. equity markets. This specificity has the advantage of realism, but it makes the immediate applicability of some microstructural models to the foreign exchange market questionable. The first task is to define some basic microstructural concepts, identifying where the foreign exchange market fits into the context they provide. Such a taxonomy is important, because one of the fundamental lessons of the microstructure lit-12A similar situation obtains on the New York Stock Exchange, where specialists act as either brokers or marketmakers, depending on the level of activity in the market. 13 5ee Wolinsky (1990), p. 1. He goes onto analyze theoretically the difference in the price discovery process between centralized and decentralized markets. Schwartz (1988) , pp. 426-35, refers to centralization as "spatial consolidation." I CLASSIFYING MARKETS erature is that institutional differences can affect the efficiency of pricing and allocation.
As described above, the foreign exchange market combines two disparate auction structures for the same commodity: the interbank direct market and the brokered market. Defying a naive application of institutional Darwinism, whereby only the fitter of the two systems would survive, these trading methods appear to coexist comfortably." The direct market can be classified as a decentralized, continuous, openbid, double-auction market. The brokered market is a quasi-centralized, continuous, limit-book, single-auction market. The meanings of these classifications are explained below.
Centralization
In a centralized market, "trades are carried out at publicly announced prices and all traders have access to the same trading opportunities." In a decentralized market, in contrast, "prices are quoted and transactions are concluded in private meetings among agents."" A New York Stock Exchange's (NYSE) specialist system is a centralized market; the interbank direct market for foreign exchange is a decentralized one.
The distinction between centralized and decentralized markets might seem to provide a neat dichotomy of possible market structures. The multiplicity of brokers in the foreign exchange market violates this simple taxonomy, however. Each foreign exchange broker accumulates a subset of market-makers' limit orders. This network of "brokerage nodes" is as different from a fully centralized system as it is from a fully decentralized one. This arrangement is labeled here as "quasi-centralized."
Most microstructural studies have confined themselves to centralized markets, especially the NYSE's specialist system and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) System on the over-the-counter (OTC) market." Although there are a number of important decentralized markets, including the interbank direct foreign exchange market, rela-' 4 For models of specialist systems, see Demsetz (1968) , Tinic (1972) , Garman (1976) , Bradfield (1979) , Amihud and Mendelson (1980), Conroy and Winkler (1981), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Sirri (1989) . For studies of the OTC market, see Tinic and West (1972) , Benston and Hagerman (1974) , Ho and Macris (1985) and Stoll (1989) . There is some evidence that differences in the degree of centralization between various markets cause differences in market performance. Garbade, in studying the largely decentralized '!'reasury securities market, concludes that because brokerage tends to centralize trading and price information, it "uses time more efficiently,"" eliminates the most important arbitrages," and benefits dealers by ensuring that orders are executed according to price priority."
The efficiency gains of centralized price information may imply economies of scale and, thus, a natural monopoly for brokers in securities markets. This is entirely consistent with the textbook presentation of the relativel greater operational efficiency of centralized markets." Thus, the fact that a number of brokers service the foreign exchange market seems to represent a discrepancy between theory and reality. Brokers do communicate among themselves, however, to eliminate the possibility of arbitrage between limit order books. While this helps explain the multiplicity of brokers, it does not fully resolve the issue of decentralization in the interbank direct market.
Temporal Consolidation
The distinction between a continuous market and a call market involves what Schwartz refers to as the degree of "temporal consolidation."" In a call market, trading occurs at pre-appointed times (the "calls"), with arriving transaction orders detained until the next call for execution. In continuous markets, like the foreign exchange market, trading occurs at its own pace, and transaction orders are processed as they arrive. A 1-ange of intermediate arrangements falls het~veenthese two extremes.
"See Garbade (1978) . p. 497.
"The textbook argument counts trips to market. Briefly, if there are N traders, then a total of N trips to a central marketplace are required for each to haggle with everyone else; to pair them bilaterally requires a total of N(N-I)!2 trips. If trips are costly, then centralization is more efficient. "See Schwartz (1988 ( ), pp. 435-47. Garman (1976 , pp. 257' 58, also describes continuous and call markets; he refers to these as asynchronous and synchronous markets, respectively. "See Hahn (1984) , Negishi (1962) , Beja and Hakansson (1977) , as well as the references therein.
"A continuous market cannot be viewed as a continuum of infinitesimally lived call markets. Clearing supply and deMost rnicroeconorriic models assume call markets. In a Walrasian thtonnemerir model, for cxample, an auctioneer calls out a series of prices and receives buy and sell orders at each price. When a price is found for which the quantities supplied and demanded are equal, all transactions are consummated at that price. Interestingly enough, Walras based this price discovery model on the mechanics of the Paris Bourse.
Temporal consolidation can affect the performance of a market. Theoretical work indicates how continuous trading can alter-allocations, the process of price discovery and even the ultimate equilibrium price." The basic thrust of these arguments is that, with continuous ttading, earlier transactions satisfy some consumer's and producers, causing shifts in supply and detnand that affect prices for later transactions. As a result, the Pareto-efficiency characteristic of Walrasian equilibria does not necessarily obtain in continuous markets."
On the other hand, the periodic batching of orders that occurs in a call market also has disadvantages. The difference in time between order placement and execution can impose real costs on investors. A recurring argument in the literature is the willingness of investor-s to pat' more -a liquidity premium -for the ability to trade immediately. Similarly, periodic calls delay any information conveyed by prices until the time of the call, introducing price uncet-taintv in the period between the calls.
In sum, a trade-off exists between the allocational efficiency of the nearly 'Nalrasian call market system and the informational efficiency and immediacy of the continuous market system.
20 it is not clear whether the microstructure of the foreign exchange market represents a globally optimal balance of these relative ad- 
Communication of Prices
The terms "open-bid" and "limit-book" refer to ways in which price information is communicated. In an open-bid market -the open outcry system on the futures exchanges, for example -offers to buy or sell at a specified price are announced to all agents in the market. At the opposite extreme, in a sealed-bid market, orders are known only to the entity placing the order and perhaps to a disinterested auctioneer.
Direct trading in foreign exchange approximates the standard open-bid structure. The salient difference between the foreign exchange market and the standard arrangement is the bilateral pairing of participants in the foreign exchange market. In principle, any participant can contact a market-maker at any time for a price quote. The bilateral nature of such contacts and the time consumed by each contact together imply, however, that all participants cannot be simultaneously informed of the current quotes of a market-maker. This practical constraint on the dissemination of price information is significant: it introduces the possibility of genuine arbitrage, that is, of finding two market-makers whose current bid-ask spreads do not overlap.
The limit order book, which is used by both foreign exchange brokers and stock exchange specialists, is another intermediate form of price communication. Although it would be possible in principle for foreign exchange brokerage books to be fully open for public inspection, in practice only certain orders -namely, the best bid and ask on each book -are revealed to market-makers, while the others remain concealed. As in the direct market, market-makers must contact brokers bilaterally to get these "inside spreads." Knowledge of the concealed limit orders would be of speculative value to marketmakers, because an imbalanced book suggests that large future price movements are more likely in one direction than the other.
More generally, price communication is intimately related to the role of market-makers as 2lThi5 term is due to Demsetz (1968 ), p. 35. Tinic (1972 , p. 79, calls in "liquidity services."
providers of "predictable immediacy." Market participants are willing to pay a liquidity premium, usually embedded in a market-maker's spread, for the reduction in search costs implied by constant access to a counterparty. The costs of "finding" the other side of a transaction can be further broken down into the liquidity concession, the cost of communicating the information and the cost of waiting for potential counterparties to respond.22 Other things equal, an efficient system of price communication is one that minimizes such transaction costs. While the communication of price information is a central function of securities markets, the fact that the systems of price communication in the foreign exchange market are not fully centralized suggests that these systems do not represent a cost-minimizing arrangement.
Structure of Prices
The terms "double-auction" and "single-auction" refer to the nature of the prices quoted. In a double-auction market, certain participants provide prices on both sides of the market, that is, both bid and ask prices. Participants providing double-auction quotes upon demand are known as market-makers, and they must have sufficient capitalization to back up their quotes. In a singleauction market, prices are specified either' to buy or to sell, but not both. In the foreign exchange market, market-makers provide doubleauction prices, while brokers try to aggregate single-auction quotes into two-way (inside) spreads. A broker's book may occasionally be empty on one or both sides. Rather than make a market in such cases, the broker provides, respectively, a single-auction quote or none at all. Thus, whether double or single-auction prices are quoted depends largely on whether the agent quoting prices is providing market-making services or simply attempting to acquire (or sell) the commodity. This issue is related to the degree of centralization in the market. The absence of market-makers in a single-auction market, together with the presence of search costs, results in a tendency toward centralization of price information, thus facilitating the search for a counterparty. Inversely, decentralization of price information leads to a tendency The microstructure liter'ature extends well beyond a simple description of market institutions. Modeling the behavior of market participants is central to almost all discussions of microstructure. Although numerous approaches to such modeling have been taken, two common concerns are of special interest. These are the treatment of price information by market participants, and determination of the bid-ask spread. The latter raises the interrelated issues of inventory and quantity transacted.
Price Expectations
Modeling the interpretation of price information is a crucial step in constrtcting microstructural models of price discovery." Many diverse approaches have been taken in such modeling. An almost universal simplification is to model securities markets in partial equilibrium, so that prices are not determined endogeneously in the traditional general equilibrium sense. This allows the modeler to focus on the microstructure's finer details. Another common simplification is to assume that agents ignore the impact of their own behavior on the market." Rather than explicitly model such forces as general equilibrium or recursive beliefs, models posit probability distributions that produce the prices of orders in the market. Modelers have included randomness at one or both of two levels, depending on their focus. First, order prices can be generated by objective distributions, that is, by stochastic processes exogenous to the lnarket. For example, there may he a stochastic process that generates the "true" equilibrium price. Second, probability models of palticipants' subjective beliefs about prices can be used. Cont-oy and Winkler, for example, attribute subjective normal price distributions to market-makers, who use Bayesian updating to learn about the prices of incoming limit orders." Objective processes can coexist with subjective beliefs about those processes. Harsanyi suggests a consistency requirement for the subjective price distributions of multiple agents; these distributions are each equated with a conditional distribution of a single distribution known to all." Models can be further classified according to how they telate supply and demand. In particular, there are both models with single price processes and with dual price processes. In dual price models, purchase orders (whether market or limit orders) are generated by one process, while sale order-s are generated by another." 'I'he salient point here is that purchase and sale orders come from independent distributions. 'rhis independence is especially clear in Conroy and Winkler, where the distributional assumptions are explicit; there, independence implies that any sequence of buy orders, regardless of their prices arid quantities, has no effect on the subjective probability of a sell order at any price.
Statistical independence implicitly restricts the ways in which orders can be generated. Put--chase and sale orders are somehow motivated independently, although the cause of this separation is not always specified. Statistical independence is not a necessary component of a dual price process, however. Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1981) , for example, assume that actual market hid and ask prices are "Note that the converse does not appear to hold. That is, centralization does not tend to eliminate double-auction quoting. For example, the NASDAO system on the OTC stock market centralizes price information while still supporting numerous market-makers for every stock.
"Notably, the term "price" is generally too inexact in a microstructurat context. One must often distinguish at a minimum between quoted prices, transaction prices and equilibrium prices. There are also reservation prices, market-clearing prices and closing prices (see Schwartz (1988) , chapter 9, for the distinction between equilibrium and clearing prices). If unspecified here, the intended definition should be clear from the context. "The alternative, which dates at least to Keynes' "beauty contest," is recursive beliefs, in which an agent considers the feedback of her own actions on the beliefs of others, and thence how the behavior on the other agents might affect her own beliefs, etc. See Keynes (1936) , p. 156. The limiting case-an infinite recursion of beliefs-presumes extreme informational and comoutational resources on the part of agents, and models based on it are usually intrac- "See shaded insert on opposite page. "See Harsanyi (1982) , especially chapter 9, and the references therein. His consistency requirement identifies a unique equilibrium for the game.
market order is an order to trade at the best price available; a limit order specifies a price. These models represent a strain of the literature that was pioneered by Demsetz using straightforward supply and demand schedules (see shaded insert on page 63). Similar approaches were later taken by Garman (1976 independent Poisson processes and give investors joint subjective distributions over those prices. For the latter distributions, probabilistic independence of bid and ask prices is not explicitly required. Black (1989) models quantities (independent of prices) of market orders. Quantities supplied and demanded are drawn from different distributions, but the distributions are constrained to have the same mean. Garbade (1978) , on the other hand, assumes a single, unknown and fixed equilibrium price, around which market-makers set their spreads. Incoming buy and sell orders arrive via random processes whose mean arrival rates depend on the difference between the quoted bid (or ask) price and the exogenous equilibrium price and, thus, are not independent.
The most common alternative to separate purchase and sale processes is to model prices as some function of a single scalar process. This approach is in the spirit of the efficient markets literature, which posits a unique value for a security conditional on the available information, Ross (1987) points out that this approach can be regarded conceptually as a special case of the dual price process, with supply and demand infinitely elastic at a common price. Many authors reveal their theoretical roots by using terminology drawn from the literature on efficient markets. Thus, for example, Barnea describes a stock's "intrinsic value," which follows a random walk." Similarly, Copeland and Galai posit a "'true' underlying asset value ---known (cx ante) to all market participants."°In contrast 1 Garbade's (1978) exogenous equilibrium price is unknown.
It is possible to extend the single price approach beyond the efficient markets tradition by modeling the value of a security subjectively rather than as an objective fact. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , for example, begin with an exogenous random value representing the consensus value of a stock given all public information. Investors do not act on this exogenous value directly; instead, they act on their expectation of it, conditional on their information set. Ho and Stoll personalize price expectations in a similar fashion:"
We take the dealer's opinion of the "true" price of the stock to be exogenously determined by his information set and ask how the dealer prices relative to his "true" price... This subjectivization of the pricing process is significant, because it allows for heterogeneous expectations and thus for more realistic modeling of price discovery.
Research into the microstructure of the foreign exchange market should presume such heterogeneity among market-makers. There are numerous market-makers for foreign exchange: The Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRB-NY) (1989a) lists 162 dealing institutions in the U.S. interbank market. There would be little point in such superfluity if all market-makers were identical. Furthermore, it is well known that "taking a view," that is, speculating on future prices, is routine for many participants.
32 To omit this heterogeneity from a model is to ignore an important characteristic of the market.
The large proportion of market-makers in the foreign exchange market has another important modeling implication. It implies that a singleprice process is more appropriate as a theoretical representation of agents' expectations. Market-makers consistently face other market-makers, who can hold positive or negative inventories of foreign currency with equal ease. A quote that is "off the market" on the high side will be hit (i.e., traded upon) just as surely as a quote that is off on the low side. This is also true of customers, who normally enter the market with a predilection to either buy or sell. As Burnham notes:' 3
The customer knows that if the first marketmaker is too far off the market price, he can unexpectedly take the other side of the quote and resell the position to a second marketmaker.
The point is that the market-maker must expect to be penalized for underestimating as well as overestimating his counterparty's valuation of the currency. From the perspective of the market-maker, who quotes a spread and observes a response, the forces determining short-run effective demand and supply are not merely related, but indistinguishable.
"See Barnea (1974), pp. 512-14. '°SeeCopeland and Galai (1983) , p. 1458.
"See Ho and Stoll (1981) , p. 48. For a similar example, see Stoll (1978) , especially p. 1136.
"See, for example, Kubarych (1983 ), p. 29, or Burnham (1991 
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perative of arbitrage avoidance must he regarded as the first priority in individual marketniaker pricing, to which all other factors (e.g., purchasing power parity) must be subordinated.
Market-makers' Bid-Ask Spreads
'l'he bid-ask spread has attracted consider-able interest in the literature on market microstructure. The complexity of modeling the spread is largely because it requires incorporating a substantial amount of institutional detail. At a facile theoretical level,, a market-maker's spread appears to be a direct violation of the latv of one price, since it assigns two prices to the same commodity. Several explanations have been offered to resolve this seeming inconsistency. They can be roughly categorized as involving the cost of dealer services, the cost of adverse selection and the cost of holding inventory."
The dealer services argument can be traced back at least as far as Stigler (1964) , who argues that stock exchange specialists charge a "jobber's turn" as compensation for the costs of acting as a specialist. The analysis of dealer services was formalized by Demsetz (1968) , who identified "predictable immediacy" as the particular service for which investors are willing to pay. This identification hints at the complex question of what liquidity is and where it comes fi-orn. In a busy market, liquidity is a public good: a continuous stream of buyers and sellers generates predictable immediacy as a by-product of their trading.
'l'he determinants of the level of compensation are themselves a topic of debate. Stigler argues that, because centralization of exchange limits fixed costs and aggregates separate transaction orders into less risky actuarial order flows, it implies economies of scale and thus a natural monopoly for market-making. '" Smidt (1971) counters that barriers to entry among NYSE specialists allow them to exact monopoly rents from other investors. In his view, the natural monopoly argument, while used as an apology for barriers to entry, remains unsupported empirically: "There is no empirical evidence to support the proposition that lmarket-making] is, in fact, a natut-al monopoly."~Indeed, if marketmaking is a natural monopoly, barriers to entry should he unnecessary.
The foreign exchange market has no apparent barriers to entry other than the need for sufficient capitalization. It also has no apparent barriers to exit. The market supports a large and mci-easing number of competing market-makers. Unless it can be sho~-vnthat there is some subtle restriction in the foreign exchange market that prevents consolidation of the market-making function, one must conclude that market-making per se is not a natural monopoly." The multitude of market-makers also implies that they cannot earn monopoly rents by embedding a premium for predictable immediacy in the spread, although the spread may still cover the costs of processing orders.
Other research suggests that a market-maker's job is more complex than the mere sale of counterparty services. A second explanation for the bid-ask spread -adverse selection -can he traced to Bagehot (1971) . He starts with "liquidity-motivated transactors" who pay the market-maker the price of the spread in exchange for the service of predictable immediacy. The market-maker also confronts traders who have inside information, however, and who can therefore speculate profitably at the expense of the market-maket-." The market-maker must charge everyone a widet-spread to compensate for losses to the information-motivated traders.
Because of the relatively abstract nature of currencies as commodities, it is difficult to construct examples of ''inside" information on foreign exchange rates. One exception is money supply announcements, which, if known before "This is essentially the same taxonomy as provided by Barnea and Logue (1975) , although they use the terms 'liquidity theory," "adversary theory," and "dynamic price/inventory adlustment theory," respectively.
'"See Stigler (1964 ), p. 129. ' 7 See Smidt (1971 , p. 64.
"For example, in the context of the OTC stock market, Benston and Hagerman (1974) , p. 362, conlecture that. "dealers may face positively sloped marginal cost curves which shift down as industry output increases." The idea is that market-making per se is not a natural monopoly, even though the industry as a whole experiences economies ot scale. Hamilton (1976) also addresses the natural monopoly question; Reinganum (1990) provides evidence on liquidity premia for NYSE vs. NASDAQ stocks. "This situation is called adverse selection, because, in a market with competing market-makers, the one who gets the insider's business is a loser rather than a winner.
Bagehot also posits a third class of investors, who only think they have inside information; they speculate, but lose on average, and are indistinguishable to the market-maker from the liquidity-motivated traders.
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publicly distributed, might provide a basis for profitable speculation. Another form of information that can be construed as inside information is knowledge of an arbitrage opportunity. Consider a hypothetical market in which there are numerous decentralized market-makers who do not quote spreads, but single prices at which they are willing both to buy and sell. Unless there were a perfect consensus among the market-makers on the value of the foreign currency, all of them would be vulnerable to arbitrage. A decentralized market makes a perfect consensus difficult to achieve. Without centralizing price information, it is impossible to know if no arbitrage opportunities exist. A bid-ask spread, in contrast, allows a market-maker to include an error tolerance in her prices, thus facilitating a price consensus: it is easier to get bid-ask spreads to overlap than to get scalar prices to coincide. The spread also provides the market-maker with some degree of protection from adverse selection in the form of arbitrage.
The bid-ask spread is also affected by inventory considerations. This idea dates back at least as far as Barnea and Logue (1975) A°The notion of a desired inventory level for the marketmaker underlies all of these models. In the simplest case, the desired level is set at zero, and a constant spread is shifted up and down on a price scale to equalize the probability of receiving a purchase order with that of receiving a sale order. The result is that the expected change in Inventory is always equal to zero, and (with all trades for one round lot) the inventory level follows a simple random walk.
An undesirable implication of random-walk models of inventory is the inevitable bankruptcy of the market-maker. Finite capitalization levels for market-makers impose upper and lower bounds on allowable inventories. Because inventory follows a random walk, with probability one It will reach either its upper or lower bound in a finite number of trades." The dynamic optimization models of Bradfield (1979) (1971) , although Smith's paper does not explicitly develop the connection between the market-makei's inventory and his spread-Formal models of the relationship between inventories and spreads can be found in Stoll (1978) , Amihud and Mendelson (1980) , Ho and Stoll (1981) and Sirri (1989) , among others. 4l5~, for example, Ross (1983), pp. 106-07. over time in the face of a stochastic order flow, will shift both bid and ask rates downward (upward) and increase the width of the spread when a positive (negative) inventory has accumulated. 2
We should expect two of these three rationales for the spread to apply to market-makers' bid-ask spreads in the foreign exchange market. Because there are numerous market-makers, competition should eliminate their ability to earn monopoly rents by charging a premium for predictable immediacy per se. The adverse selection argument does apply in the foreign exchange market, however, since the spread allows market-makers some protection against arbitrage opportunities. Arbitrage opportunities can be construed as a form of inside information in a market where price information is not centralized. In accordance with the dynamic optimization models, a market-maker's inventory level should affect the spread, widening and shifting it as inventories accumulate.
Brokers' Spreads
So far, the discussion of the bid-ask spread has focused on models in which bid and ask prices are set by individual market-makers. The dual role of the stock exchange specialist suggests that this is only part of the story. Spreads are produced in two fundamentally different ways. It is only when limit orders are sparse that a NYSE specialist must step in as a marketmaker to provide an "orderly market."~' When limit order volume is sufficient, the specialist acts as a broker, accounting for incoming limit orders on the lhnit order book, and pairing market orders against them. Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1979) note that inadequate attention has been given to the fact that not all prices are market-maker spreads. The market often makes itself without specialist assistance, through the aggregation of limit orders on the book.
The foreign exchange market differs from the NYSE in that the market-making and brokerage roles are separated: market-makers do not act as brokers, and brokers do not make markets, Seeshaded insert on page 66. 43 The NYSE defines this role in rule 104: "the specialist should maintain a continuous market with price continuity and close bid and asked prices, and minimize the effect of temporary disparity between public supply and demand." See Leffler and Faiwefl (1963) Tberef ore, it is even more appropriate to model separate limit ot dci s. <I his arrangcnwnt might brokered spreads as determined in a fundamen< be modeled as a pali of exti eme oi dci statisti( tall different wa~<from market-maker spreads.
from independent disti ibutions of pm cha e and
The separation of roles also has other implicasale limit orders. The disti ibution of these statistions for modeling foreign exchange brokerage. tics would have to be conditional on limit 01 der A brokered spread is the combination of the volume and on the fict that the best ask must best bid and best ask. received by the broker as always exceed the best bid, since crossing 01 ciFVflFPM RFSFPVF RaNK OF St WuiS a ers transact immediately and are removed from the book.~Perhaps because of its complexity, such a derivation has not been attempted. Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1979) model limit orders as generated by "yawl" distributions These distributions satisfy three heuristics for the incentives of investors placing limit orders~The heuristics are motivated by a notion of the centralized exchange as a market for immediacy; placers of limit orders produce immediacy, and placers of market orders consume it. This relationship between limit and market orders is formalized in Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1981) , where each half of the brokered spread is assumed to be generated by a compound Poisson process A minimum brokered spread results: if the limit order's bid (ask) price is sufficiently close to the specialist's ask (bid), the benefit to the investor of being able to specify the price of a limit otder is overwhelmed by the cost of foregone immediacy.
Because models of the informational content of brokered spreads are few, the literature offers little guidance in modeling brokered quotes in the foreign exchange market. 'I'he yawl distribution is the only explicit distributional form for brokered spreads in the literature. Unfoi-tunately, its heuristic basis cannot be transferred directly to the foreign exchange market, because market-makers there differ from stock market investors. Indeed, this may be an instance in which the foreign exchange market informs microstructure theory rather than the other way around. The extant approaches to brokerage treat it as a service facilitating predictable immediacy. This aspect of brokerage is redundant in the foreign exchange market, because of the multitude of marketmakei-s, each providing immediacy. This redundancv suggests instead that foreign exchange hi-okerage serves some other function.
One motive for trading through a foreign exchange broker is to maintain anonymity -the name of the hank placing a limit order is not revealed unless a deal is consummated and then only to the counterpart~'.
1°A nonymity is valuable, because revealing a need to buy or sell a cui-rency puts a market-maker at a bargaining disadvantage. In addition, anonymity can help pair market-makers who ordinarily would not contact each other directly. 'l'hese issues have not been explored at a theoretical level. Until an adequate microstructural model of the strategic benefits of anonymity is developed, the theoretical understanding of foreign exchange brokerage will be limited CONCLUSION'S Students of the foreign exchange market can draw several lessons from the literature on market microstructure. The most fundamental of these is that the institutional details of exchange in a market can affect all aspectsprice, allocational, informational and operational -of the market's efficiency. A multitude of market-makers who can provide liquidity, or predictable immediacy, arises in response to the decentralization of the market. As a result, search costs are reduced relative to a world without market-makers, because finding one of many market-makers amounts to finding a counterpartv. Brokerage also reduces search costs by achieving a degree of centralization in price information.
An unanswered question is why the specific combination of trading structures characteristic of the foreign exchange market -a decentralized, open-book, direct arrangement and a quasi-centralized, limit-hook, brokered arrangement -should coexist. Apparently, each structure has relative advantages, but a full analysis of these advantages is lacking. Is there a single microsti-ucture that would combine the relative advantages of the chrect and brokered arrangements? Put another way, why does the microstructure of the foreign exchange market differ from that of the stock exchanges, the futures pits and the OTC stock market? Answering these questions will require a fuller specification of the objectives of a trading system and a better understanding of the impact of rnicrostructural arrangements on those goals. These issues pro\'ide a motive for deeper investigation of the behavior of the foreign cx-45 The yawl distribution, named for its resemblance to a sailboat, is a probability distribution contrived for modeling the generation of buy (or sell) limit orders. See Cohen, Maier, Schwartz and Whitcomb (1979 , 1986 for details. 46 5ee Kubarych (1983), p. 16, Burnham (1991), p. 141, and  Federal Reserve Bank of New York (l989b), p. 41-3. I I I I I I 1 I I ~4Anorder statistic is defined as follows: the sample realizations of a finite number of independent random variables are ranked in increasing order, and the kth order statistic is the kth number in that list. For the foreign exchange market, the modeling is still more complex, since brokers compare books amongst themselves in the sense that incoming orders can cross against any book.
change m~u'ketand its participants. Marketmakers are the crucial element: they pi-ovide all tr~msaction prices in the market and are involved in at least one sidle of every deal. The microstructure literature has developed numerous models of the interpretation and setting of prices by traders. 1'he diversity of expectations models used in the literature illustrates the importance of tailoring such models to the specific environment confronted by market participants.
Given that a foreign exchange market-maker's double-auction quote can be hit on either side (bid or ask) with equal ease, he must try to maneuver his spread to bracket the market's consensus valuation of the foreign currency. In other words, suppliers and demanders of currency are indistinguishable to the market-maker cx ante. The inability to separate the forces dietermining effective demand from those tIetermining effective supply in the very short run imply that a single-price expectations process (rather than a dual-price process) is appropriate in modeling market-makers in the foreign exchange market.
A market-maker's bid-ask spread serves several purposes. Competition among market-makers in the foreign exchange market implies that they should be unable to charge a monopoly premium for the set-vice of predictable immediacy. Instead, the spread obviates the need for perfect price consensus by giving the market-maker some protection from arbitrageurs with superior price information. While arbitrage avoidance must he considered a primary goal in setting a market-maker's bid and ask quotes, the spread provides flexibility elsewhere. Just as arbitrage ayoidance is concerned with accurately estimating current prices, speculation is concerned with estimating future prices. B~'changing in size and shifting up or down, the spread can control stochastically the market-maker's foreign currency inventory in the face of random order flows. Systematic empirical studs' of the effect of inventories on market-makers' spreads is still needed, however.
The brokered spread is less well understood than the market-maker's spread, and certain areas are ripe for further research. Theoretical models of hrokered spreads are few. The existing rationales for brokerage maintain that it provides liquidity services. In the foreign exchange market, however, numerous marketmakers make the liquidity services providedl by brokerage superfluous. Descriptions of the foreign exchange market suggest instead that anonymity is an important motive for trading in the broket-ed market. Yet the stt-ategic value of anonymity in foreign exchange quoting is not well understood at a theoretical level. In addition. there is not a clear understanding of the differences in price information between a mat-ket-maker's spread and a ht'oker's spread; this too remains a topic for future i-esearch.
From a broader perspective, a better understanding of institutional choice and change as regards securities market mnicrostructure is necessary. Most microstructural research has been devoted to analyzing the impact of microstructural factors on important economic variables, such as price and allocation. Relativel little attention has been paid to the effect of economic factot-s on the choice of an institutional microstructure . I I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
